The latest impressive technological advancements in the telecommunications domain have entailed the involvement of new network operators and over-the-top (OTT) providers that offer their services over the existing networks. This entry of new stakeholders has changed the Internet dynamics and triggered a long-standing conversation on whether different types of data in the network should be prioritized, also known as the network neutrality debate. On the one hand, OTT providers benefit from the current neutral Internet policy of not discriminating against any application or content in order to transfer their data for free, whereas network providers would like to seize the business opportunity and create revenues by supporting the prioritized delivery of data. In this article, we want to shed light on the emerging Internet ecosystem and the conflicting interests of its stakeholders. To that end, we first identify the different Internet players and describe their interrelationships. Furthermore, in an effort to offer a new perspective on the network neutrality debate, we propose two novel econometric models that employ recent financial data to capture the relationship between the OTT revenues and the financial gains and investments of the telecommunication operators. Our empirical results provide tangible answers to fundamental questions that had not been answered before, showcasing that OTT and telecommunication providers have aligned interests and their collaboration could be beneficial to both parties.
IntroductIon
The phenomenal adoption of mobile devices and applications creates an unprecedented need for providing the end users with ubiquitous and uninterrupted Internet connectivity. This technology evolution has two immediate effects, as the existing network operators are prompted to invest in order to extend and upgrade the network infrastructure, while the telecommunications market expansion motivates new players, such as virtual operators and content delivery providers, to become involved in service provisioning. Besides the aforementioned changes in the networking part, we are also experiencing a paradigm shift, as the proliferation of mobile communications has brought new stakeholders to the spotlight. More specifically, the technological advancements have enabled the introduction of over-the-top (OTT) providers, who offer their services over the existing deployed telecommunication networks and are mainly classified as content distributors (e.g., YouTube), social network operators (e.g., Twitter), and companies that offer communication services (e.g., WhatsApp and Skype) similar to the conventional services provided by the network operators.
The entry of new players with conflicting interests in the field has further complicated the already obscure multi-tenant structure of the Internet. More specifically, network operators argue that the new companies use their network to transfer huge amounts of traffic without generating direct revenues for their benefit. On the other hand, OTT providers, invoking the network neutrality rules [1] , consider network providers as common carriers who should not be given the right to prioritize the traffic. Although there have been some recent efforts by telecommunications regulators (i.e., the Federal Communications Commission and the Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications) to bring this long-standing dispute to an end, the opposing parties do not show willingness to compromise and adhere to their initial stances.
In light of the above discussion, the aim of this article is twofold. First, considering the latest developments and the entrance of new stakeholders into the Internet domain, we try to characterize the distinct roles of the multiple tenants and identify the issues that arise in their interrelationships. Second, given the massive appearance of competitive OTT applications in the market during the end of the last decade, we believe that sufficient time has elapsed to enable a clear analysis of the relationship between communication OTT and telecommunication providers. To that end, we conduct a detailed econometric study to examine the correlation among a series of relevant parameters, including the network providers' growth, network investments, OTT revenues, and Internet penetration. Our findings constitute an important contribution to the network neutrality debate, as they provide some initial tangible answers to two fundamental open questions:
• Do OTT providers constitute a threat for mobile operators and their financial interests? • Should OTT providers be burdened with extra fees to account for the operator's expenses for the network infrastructure expansion that is required to accommodate the additional traffic demands?
The authors seek to shed light on the emerging Internet ecosystem and the conflicting interests of its stakeholders. They first identify the different Internet players and describe their interrelationships.
In an effort to offer a new perspective on the network neutrality debate, they propose two novel econometric models that employ recent financial data to capture the relationship between the OTT revenues and the financial gains and investments of the telecommunication operators.
In the following section, we briefly present the key Internet stakeholders and their interrelationships, focusing on the network neutrality concept. Subsequently, we provide the two econometric models and the empirical results derived from our analysis, focusing on the OTT providers that offer competitive communication services. Finally, we discuss the practical importance of our results in the network neutrality debate, forming some interesting future research directions.
Internet stAkeholders, relAtIonshIps
And network neutrAlIty
Internet is a broad concept, usually characterized by a physical infrastructure (e.g., servers, routers, base stations) and network services (e.g., voice, video, messaging). As the rapid developments in the telecommunications domain have lately brought new players to the forefront (a general classification is shown in Fig. 1 ), the aim of this section is to identify the involved parties and their relationships in the evolving Internet ecosystem. • Content providers. The relationship between OTTs and network providers is controversial, since the offered services may either be similar to those of ISPs (i.e., communication services), leading to direct competition and conflicting interests, or complementary (i.e., social networking and content distribution), thus adding value to Internet connectivity. Apart from the distinctive roles of the OTT providers, the OTT applications have different quality of service (QoS) demands (e.g., bandwidth, delay, jitter, etc.) that define their requirements in network resources. These limitations, along with the multi-tenant nature of the Internet, imply complex ties and correlations among the existing stakeholders that will be discussed in the following section. , the ability to access every online destination from any address). As a result, end-to-end Internet connectivity relies on the transfer of data through a complex interconnection of networks owned by different providers. This paradigm encourages network providers to establish mutual business agreements to regulate the data transfer through their networks. The two prevalent types of economic agreements between interconnected providers are known as peering and transit. Peering agreements concern the data transfer (usually symmetric) between two networks, where both parties benefit equally, and hence no fees are paid. A peering arrangement can be either private or public. In case of private peering, which mainly takes place between IBPs (and few very large ISPs), a dedicated physical connection (e.g., fiber links) is created to enable the exchange of large traffic volumes in a secure and reliable way. On the other hand, the majority of ISPs form public peering relationships to exchange smaller amounts of traffic through shared networks, known as Internet exchange points. Whereas peering agreements are usually concluded between equivalent partners with mutual expected benefits, smaller ISPs must typically pay transit fees to larger networks (IBPs or large ISPs) to gain global Internet access. Different business models have been developed to match the providers' needs, where transit payment may be determined according to various parameters, e.g., the requested capacity, the actual volume of exchanged traffic, or the particular routing of the data.
Internet stAkeholders

Internet relAtIonshIps And network neutrAlIty
The recent deployment of CDNs has driven a new type of commercial agreement between the Internet stakeholders, namely paid peering, which, unlike public peering, incurs a charge for the data exchange, but without provision for endto-end data delivery (unlike transit agreements). The key incentive for alliances between CDNs and ISPs lies in the market share, as the CDNs have a strong customer base consisting of content providers that pay to ensure high-quality content delivery to the end users, while ISPs have direct access to the end users.
Different relationships are developed in the case of virtual operators, who must negotiate the wholesale price for Internet access and the provided service guarantees with the host ISP. In addition, the need for extensive network infrastructure (to meet the increasing service demands) in conjunction with the effort to minimize capital (CAPEX) and operational (OPEX) expenses, have motivated operators to adopt the infrastructure sharing paradigm. This novel concept encompasses various degrees of sharing, including the passive sharing of infrastructure elements (e.g., antenna sites), the active sharing of network components (e.g., routers) and the joint provisioning of user services through roaming-based agreements.
The last, but equally important, class of business relationships among Internet stakeholders refers to the pricing mechanisms between the service providers (either ISPs or OTT providers) and the end users. Regarding the ISPs, the widespread use of broadband technologies has led to a tendency of charging flat rates for voice services. On the other hand, OTTs, as newer players in the market, have adopted more attractive and targeted business models [2] , such as periodical subscriptions, payments by transactions, and freemium services (with free basic usage but advanced features under payment), while advertisements, donations, and data monetization are alternative ways to increase their revenues.
The research community has extensively tried to model these complex relationships between the Internet players, from both a technical and economic perspective. Optimal peering decisions according to the network formation have been studied in [3] . Game theory has been a valuable tool for modeling the peering and transit interactions among ISPs. For instance, employing the concept of Shapley value from coalition games has led to the design of a fair profit-sharing mechanism among Internet stakeholders, which further encourages peering arrangements between neighboring ISPs [4] . The potential benefits of a close alliance between ISPs and CDN are discussed in [5] , where a set of mechanisms to enable this collaboration is proposed. As new players have been entering the telecommunications sector, their market viability and potential business strategies are explored through techno-economic analysis. The penetration of virtual ISPs (vISPs) to the market has been studied to identify new opportunities and potential threats to traditional operators [6] . Advanced game-theoretic algorithms for the efficient utilization of the shared infrastructure among multiple network operators have also been proposed, aiming to save energy and reduce operation costs [7] . Finally, new challenges in the design of charging and billing mechanisms arise as multiple providers compete for the provision of Internet ser- vices, making imperative the need for flexible, scalable and fair pricing schemes [8] .
ISPs vs. OTTs and Network Neutrality: Unlike the above discussed existing relationships, which are relatively clear, the recent entry of OTT providers entails new ties that have not yet been definitively developed. This paradigm shift was the main impetus for the opening of a very serious and long-standing conversation about Internet data regulation, commonly referred to as the network neutrality debate. In essence, network neutrality is the absence of discrimination and restrictions on the transmission of content. Although the idea of service differentiation is not new and traffic shaping has already been applied in the Internet (e.g., through DiffServ implementation in network routers), the network neutrality debate was mainly ignited in 2005 by the statement of the AT&T's chairman that he was not willing to let content providers use the network for free, 1 creating two opposing camps, i.e., for and against network neutrality.
Supporters of network neutrality include, among others, the main OTT players, and their basic argument is that the Internet evolution and success have mainly relied on network neutrality. Hence, ISPs should not have any control of the network data, otherwise newer online companies would have a disadvantage, eventually leading to the transformation of the Internet from a market ruled by innovation to one ruled by deal-making. 2 On the other hand, the most zealous opponents of network neutrality are the ISPs, who have set two basic arguments, claiming that OTT companies:
• Have conflicting interests and provide competitive services, thus constituting a threat to their own growth.
• Distort incentives for investment, as they essentially exploit the network already deployed by ISPs, acting as free riders. Hence, to overcome these issues, they propose to impose extra fees to major OTT providers to prioritize their traffic, using the extra revenue for network expansion and enhancement of broadband access to more consumers.
The importance of the network neutrality debate worldwide [9] has motivated the research community to study the interaction among the different entities from a theoretical point of view. These works usually employ game theoretic tools (e.g., non-cooperative game theory and Stackelberg games) to analyze the forces driving the Internet economics evolution [10] , to propose new business models [11, 12] , and to study different aspects of the problem as, for instance, the impact of competition between ISPs on network neutrality [13] , the feasibility of charging content providers [14] , or even the potential of building new OTT infrastructures exclusively employed for content distribution [15] . However, despite the interesting theoretical conclusions of these works, the observation of the actual progress of the firms would be of great importance, providing us with further insights, as we will see in the following section. 
Isps vs competItIve ott provIders: empIrIcAl econometrIc AnAlysIs
The end of the previous decade was a key point for the Internet evolution, mainly because of the introduction of LTE and the widespread proliferation of smart devices. Over the last few years, these new technologies have been solidly established in our everyday life, giving us a clear picture of the landscape along with empirical observational data. Hence, we believe that the time is ripe to employ econometric tools to examine the interaction of the new stakeholders from a macroscopic viewpoint and quantify the impact of relevant parameters on the development of ISPs and OTT providers. In this section, we provide details about the data and the adopted methodology, and we discuss the outcome of our research.
methodology And dAtA
The empirical analysis has been conducted with regard to the period 2008-2013 (both years inclusive), considering data from ten ISPs and three OTT providers that offer competitive communication services. The involved stakeholders and the employed variables of our study are summarized in Table 1 .
The data set has been constructed by combining inputs from a large number of reliable sources, as there is no available database with the aggregate information. 3 It is worth noting that the calculation of the ISP revenues and CAPEX per country is straightforward, as the ISPs are physically present and offer their services in each country. However, as the revenue of an OTT company in a particular country is not available, we have made an approximation, taking into account the total annual revenue of the company and the portion of the customers in a given country. For instance, assuming that an OTT provider has a total annual revenue of $1M and 20 percent of its total users reside in Italy, we consider that the corresponding revenue in Italy is $200K. For the number of Internet users, we have combined the Internet penetration rate and the population of the country, while the real GDP has been estimated by the nominal GDP and the Consumer Price Index. 4 The descriptive statistics that summarize the basic features (i.e., minimum (x min ), maximum(x max ), average ( -x) values and standard deviation (s ) of the data are presented in Table 2 .
The employed data set constitutes a balanced panel, as it contains observations of multiple parameters obtained each year for all parties. The analysis of cross-sectional time series panel data is usually associated with two important linear regression models: fixed and random effects. Their main difference lies in how they characterize the dependent variable. From a theoretical point of view, the fixed effects model is more suitable when each analyzed entity has unique individual characteristics that may have some influence on the variables, whereas the random effects model may be employed if the entities can be considered as random extractions from a population. In our case, the most appropriate approach is the fixed effects model, since the entities under study are countries with distinct characteristics that may be correlated with the considered parameters (e.g., the regulations of a given country could have an effect on the ISP investments or the OTT revenues). Our choice was further validated by the Hausman test, which is typically employed to evaluate the suitability of each method for a given data panel.
empIrIcAl results
Following the fixed effects approach, we propose two econometric models for the revenue of ISPs and OTTs (R ISPit and R OTTit , respectively), for a given country i and year t, formulated as The end of the previous Model A:
to capture the impact of the explanatory variables (right part of the models) on the dependent variables R ISP and R OTT ). All variables have already been defined in Table 1 , while a i (in Model A) and k i (in Model B) are the unknown intercepts for each country (considered fixed), b j , g j ∀j  [1, 4] are the coefficients of the respective explanatory variables, and e it , u it are the error factors. For the estimation of our models, the statistical software package Stata (Release 13, StataCorp. 2013) has been employed, and the results are provided in Table 3 . Our key aim has been to determine the dynamics among the ISPs' growth, the revenues of the competitive OTT providers, and the CAPEX investment (highlighted in the table). As a first observation, it is worth noting that the obtained results for these relationships have a high statistical significance in both models, as indicated by the p-value (i.e., p < 0.001), which is used in statistics to support the strength of an empirical conclusion. Moreover, the interpretation of these results reveals two very intriguing insights. First, both models verify the positive correlation between the revenues of ISPs and OTT providers. More specifically, the coefficient of 9.81 (Model A) implies that the increase of one unit in the revenue of the OTT providers is accompanied by an average increase of approximately 10 units in the ISP revenues, while the coefficient of 0.03 (Model B) also confirms that the growth of the ISPs is positively correlated with the growth of the OTT providers. Second, the conclusions for the network investments are also very interesting, as it is shown that CAPEX have a positive influence on the ISP revenues (with a particular coefficient of 3.21), while adversely affecting the OTT income (with a particular coefficient of -0.13). Regarding the total number of users, the results in Model B verify with high significance that Internet penetration is positively related with the OTT profits as expected, while the results in Model A are counter-intuitive, demonstrating a negative relationship between Internet penetration and ISP revenues. Although reasonable explanations can be found for this relationship (e.g., additional operational costs), it should be noted that the significance of this relationship, as indicated by the respective p-value, is lower compared to the previous results, and further research should be done in this direction for more concrete conclusions. Finally, the impact of GDP in both models is not statistically significant.
dIscussIon And open reseArch lInes
The observations of the empirical analysis are very important, as they provide some initial tangible arguments and answers to the questions posed in the network neutrality debate. Let us recall that the ISPs, who are among the most passionate adversaries against network neutrality, consider the OTT companies as a major threat for their own interests, and they have expressed their willingness to charge them with extra fees, or even require the OTT providers to contribute to the expansion of the telecommunication network infrastructure. However, our study has weakened these particular claims, providing empirical evidence that the economic prosperity of the OTT firms is in line with the financial performance of the ISPs. Consequently, it can be concluded that these two important stakeholders fruitfully coexist in the telecommunications and Internet domain, and they should probably work more closely together to achieve a mutually profitable cooperation. 5 In addition, our empirical results also demonstrated the positive effect that network investments have on ISP revenue, while they can be detrimental to the development of the OTT providers. Our results constitute a first step toward refuting the accusations toward OTT companies for free riding and stress the need for additional studies on the causal relationship among the stakeholders.
In a nutshell, our research has brought to light some important facts with regard to the relationship between ISPs and OTT companies. However, as in most serious debates, the truth may lie somewhere in the middle. More specifically, the possible changes in the way the Internet operates should be made considering the common right of everyone to access the Internet safely and with high quality of experience (e.g., prioritizing realtime services) and not according to specific corporate interests (e.g., prioritizing video traffic of a particular company) that may lead to monopoly situations. Furthermore, our work can be considered as an initial effort toward characterizing the dynamics between different stakeholders in the telecommunications market and paves the way for new research lines that will take into consideration the following:
Recent Developments: The most immediate step consists in the extension of our results for the years after 2013. More specifically, updated empirical studies are required to follow the extremely rapid Internet evolution. Furthermore, more variables (e.g., average revenue per user and number of ISPs in a given country) and more accurate data can be taken into account, as more information about the growth of the companies and their market share in different countries 5 In an effort to bridge this gap, Ericsson recently announced the launch of OTT Cloud Connect (OCC), an open cloud service that allows mobile operators across the globe to "connect" to multiple OTT players to deliver new and creative services to users. See: http:// www.reuters.com/article/ idUSFWN161019 Legend: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 N  number of observations R 2  coefficient of determination Adj. R 2  adjusted coefficient of determination become available. Forthcoming work could also take into consideration emerging applications (e.g., Snapchat, Viber, etc.), as well as business activities and transactions (e.g., the WhatsApp acquisition by Facebook).
New Players and Industries: Our study has focused on the relationship between ISPs and competitive OTT providers that offer similar communication services. However, network neutrality also concerns other major OTT players that provide complementary services to the end users. The most representative example consists in the recent agreement between Netflix and Comcast for enhanced QoS, which came in response to the slow connection speeds. In the same context, it would also be interesting to study the relationship between existing service providers and their OTT competitors (e.g., traditional TV operators vs. OTT Internet TV, or even outside the telecom industry with taxi services vs. Uber and hotel services vs. AirBnB) since they have conflicting interests.
Evolving Network Topologies: Although OTT applications have been initially deployed over existing networks, their explosive growth has been driving OTT providers toward acquiring proprietary equipment and infrastructure. Facebook and Google have already initiated efforts toward installing fiber cables across the Pacific ocean, while Akamai has been deploying thousands of servers worldwide. This radical evolution will soon create the need for new Internet maps and theoretical studies for the smooth incorporation of the new infrastructure in the existing networks. Moreover, this development will add more variables to be studied in econometric approaches, while fostering new business models with regard to cost sharing among the involved stakeholders.
5G Enabling Technologies: Next generation wireless networks will embrace a list of new technologies, including Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing, and software defined networking (SDN), which will create important opportunities for content and application providers to deliver highly innovative services. The experience gained from the empirical and theoretical studies on existing relationships will certainly serve as a guide for capturing future disruptive developments.
conclusIon
In this article, we tried to elucidate the roles of the different Internet stakeholders and interpret the emerging interrelationships, focusing on the network neutrality concept. In addition, through a detailed econometric analysis on a series of parameters (including OTT revenues, ISP network investments, and ISP revenues), we revealed two important findings. First, the interests of OTTs and ISPs are not necessarily conflicting, since the economic gains of the OTTs are positively correlated with the ISP revenues and vice versa. Second, there is no clear motivation for the OTT providers to contribute financially to the network infrastructure, as CAPEX seem to stimulate the economic growth of ISPs, while being detrimental for OTT profits. Our research could serve as a starting point for future studies that will further clarify the interaction among the different entities in the evolving Internet ecosystem. He has authored over 70 publications in peer-reviewed journals and conferences on various topics, including energy efficient network planning and sharing, 5G wireless networks, cooperative communications, radio resource management, and network economics. He has participated in several European and Spanish national projects (e.g., GREENET, Green-T, CO2GREEN, etc.) and has served as an expert evaluator of research projects funded by the Romanian Government through the National Council for Scientific Research. He has been nominated as an exemplary reviewer for IEEE Communications Letters. He received the best paper award in IEEE GLO-BECOM 2014, the best demo award in IEEE CAMAD 2014, the 1st prize in the IEEE ComSoc Student Competition (as a Mentor) and the EURACON best student paper award in EuCNC 2016. 
